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the Hungarian Credit Institution Sector*
Tamás Szücs – József Ulbert
The crisis demonstrated that the role of the accounting standards applicable to 
fair valuation may be particularly important in the credit institution sector. The 
paper examines the influence exerted on the balance sheets of the Hungarian 
credit institutions by the fair valuation and the international and the Hungarian 
economic policy regulatory changes relating to valuation. We place special emphasis 
on examining whether the foreign-owned credit institution subsidiaries operating 
in Hungary and their parent banks responded differently to the challenges posed 
by the crisis. We elaborated a method for the measurement of the real involvement 
and using this we examine how the fair value involvement of the Hungarian credit 
institution sector has changed before, during and after the crisis. Generalising the 
problem, we found that the degree of the fair value involvement may represent an 
additional risk factor upon assessing the credit institutions’ operational efficiency 
and that the Hungarian subsidiaries followed a slightly different path than their 
parent banks.
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: G01, M40, M41
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1. Need for fair value
When examining the history of accounting rules, the thought of valuation at fair 
value first emerged in the early ‘80s. In parallel with the spread of globalisation, the 
world’s financial markets were accomplished and commenced an unprecedented 
development. New markets appeared on the scene, which also offered new 
investment opportunities; thereby, adding colour to the spectrum of traditional 
transactions.
In addition to the classic transactions, the innovative, novel financial products and 
the increasingly complex financial instruments gained growing importance. The 
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understanding and pricing of these products, as well as the determination and 
modelling of their value, represents an increasing challenge for investors.
The acceleration of the spreading of novel financial instruments in the financial 
markets was fuelled by the perceivable growth in risk in certain risk segments, as 
the innovative products were often meant – as claimed by the architects of these 
products – to provide protection against the increased risk.
It is also beyond doubt that one driver of the development of capital and money 
markets could have been the goal to expand market turnover, since this carried the 
opportunity for the creators and distributors of the innovative products to tap the 
revenues received here via various fees and services.
The escalation of these processes spanned over two to three decades, which, 
as a matter of course, was accompanied by rise in prices and the fact that the 
measurement of capital market’s performance increasingly drifted apart from real 
economy performance. The market’s value measurement function raised increasing 
doubts, particularly in the case of those novel products that had no underlying real 
economy performance at all.
The legislation, the financial methodology and the accounting profession alike were 
unable to keep pace with this rate of development, hence the investors’ increasing 
demand to determine the fair value of these novel products and to state these 
valuations on the asset side of the balance sheets appeared at the same rate as the 
rate of these products’ “sneaking into” the balance sheet and income statement 
of the investors (first and the most intensively it could be observed at the credit 
institutions, and particularly at the investment banks).
Beneish (1999) in his paper rang the alarm bells already before the turn of the 
millennium. In his opinion, fair valuation may be a good way to manipulate financial 
statements, as the incomes originating from the revaluation of certain holdings may 
entail unjustified rises in equity prices.
In this respect, albeit slightly late, from the second half of the ‘80s the company 
valuation and the accounting profession started to move in the same direction. 
In the course of determining the value of companies, the methods based on the 
principle of yield value, trying to measure the value creation function of future 
yields, also appeared in addition to the asset-based valuations. In parallel with this, 
the market-based, fair valuation started to replace the cost-based valuation in the 
international accounting practice as well (Shaffer 2012). 
Despite the parallelism, the financial approach – with the introduction of the yield 
value principle – offered a different response to the challenge than the accounting 
profession, which still sees the solution in the pricing of assets. That is, in the case 
of finances the emphasis shifted from the assets to the measurement of the assets’ 
yield earning capacity (Bélyácz 2013).
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2. The fair value concept
According to Regulation 1606/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, as of 1 January 2005 (in Hungary as of 2007) the consolidated financial 
statements of all listed companies must be prepared in accordance with the 
international accounting standards, in the course of which the application of fair 
valuation is mandatory. 
This directive specifies fair value as the amount for which an asset can be exchanged 
or a liability can be settled between well informed parties intending to conclude 
a deal, within the framework of an arm’s length transaction.
Due to its general formulation and the practical problems relating to its applicability, 
this definition has been heavily criticised from the start both in the technical 
literature and in practice.
According to Barth (2004), the estimation of the fair value of a company’s assets 
varies in time, as market considerations do appear in it, that is, it loses its stability 
in time, while volatility should be regarded as an additional risk factor, as in the 
ascending, growth phase it may serve as self-justification for the management, 
while in the descending phase it may escalate the processes. In the case of assets 
that have no real or have only limited market background, valuation is based on 
models that apply uncertain, often impractical conditions, hence the estimation 
of the value cannot be free from errors either; accordingly, fair valuation may only 
be applied in a steadily liquid market environment, where nothing hinders the 
participants from obtaining information.
According to Hitz (2007), the conditions of applying fair valuation are idealised; 
thus, the market-based valuations created with the use of these are also only 
hypothetical, as the definition does not specify, for example, whether it is 
a purchase or sale transaction. It also does not provide information on the date 
to be considered relevant for the definition of the balance sheet value, or on the 
exact meaning of the “arm’s length” market condition criterion.
These negative factors are only partially offset by the fact that the definition also 
made it possible to state such assets in the balance sheet that were formerly off-
balance sheet items, and as such remained invisible for the investors (Bosch 2012).
Bromwich (2007) also provides a good summary of the, often not too practical, 
assumptions underlying the definition of fair value.
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Table 1
Impracticable conditions of fair value 
Group Underlying consideration
1. Prices a) The prices used upon the measurement of fair value are based on the market, 
irrespective of the trading objective of the economic agent. 
b) The price is a sales (exit) price.
c) The prices do not contain the transaction costs.
2. Market a) The transactions take place on the usual (primary) market (highest volume and activity).
b) If several markets exist, the most advantageous will be the one where profit 
maximisation can be achieved. 
3. Market 
participants
a) Unrelated, i.e. independent parties.
b) Well-informed participants, able to understand the basic attributes of the asset 
component and the transaction.
c) When obtaining the necessary information, they act with due diligence and do 
their best to understand the information.
d) The individual transactions are without any compulsion. 
e) The individuals have the capacity and willingness necessary for concluding the 
transaction.
4. The 
presumed usage
a) The financial instruments are clearly defined by their cash flow structure.
b) In the case of assets, estimation of the offer price that represents the most 
profitable usage at the time when the valuation is performed by the market 
participant, which is:1
•  in-use valuation (can be used together with other assets): defining the highest use value;
•  in the case of (independently usable) exchange utilisation value defined on the basis 
of individual valuation.2
c) Of the prices mentioned in point b) the fair value will be the highest one.
d) The use is possible in physical terms, acceptable in legal terms and feasible in 
financial terms.
e) The transfer of liabilities is possible under identical credit risk (default risk).
5. Accounting 
assumptions
Traditional accounting assumption:
•  The measurement must be performed in the case of all separable asset 
components and the aggregated groups of those.
•  The measurement takes account of the condition and location of the asset, if 
relevant.
Source: Bromwich (2007:53).
While the general market and economic condition was reliable and stable, the 
definition, despite all of its faults, in fact remained workable. The number of 
problems started to rise in parallel with the accomplishment of the new crisis.
1  The assumption of the in-use valuation premise is that market participants want to use the asset together 
with other assets; thus, the fair value of the assets is influenced, typically increased, by the synergies 
among the assets.
2  In the case of the in-exchange valuation premise it can be assumed that the asset can be utilised on its own 
and this is the way the market participants can realise the maximum profit with it.
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3. Fair value and crisis
Has the possibility of fair valuation opened Pandora’s box, that is, has it contributed 
to the development and later on to the escalation of the crisis, or quite the contrary, 
it opened the possibility of managing the crisis?
Several authors believe (Wallison 2008; Whalen 2008) that the procyclical nature of 
fair valuation could have been the main cause of the crisis. They emphasise that fair 
valuation is the primary reason for the unforeseen fall in property value and for the, 
also unexpected, growth in the instability of financial enterprises. The application 
of FASB ASC 8203 and the fair value-based calculation of the banks’ capitalisation 
caused a downward spiral in property value and contributed to the major fall in 
solvency. The classification of instruments held to maturity as trading assets was 
a solution that served business interests. According to the related criticism, often 
even assets without objective market price were reclassified.
According to other opinions (Pozen 2009; Le Pan 2008), fair value accounting cannot 
be the cause of the crisis. Moreover, certain opinions go beyond this and emphasise 
that it is much easier for the managers of banks and insurers to put the blame on 
the accounting standards rather than on the capital adequacy regulations controlled 
by the credit institutions. The fair value accounting provided early warning of the 
impacts and problems that appeared as a result of the incorrect decisions relating to 
the secondary mortgage market loans and the credit default swaps (Rerolle 2008).
According to Power (2008) the authors of the standard should have spent much 
more time on the revision of the valuation in order to make the fair valuation model 
usable in a much wider domain. Simply, it was introduced too early.
In their works, Veron (2008) and Shamkuts (2010) designate liquidity shortage 
and procyclicality as the two important problems of fair valuation. Market price is 
essential for the definition of the fair value. If this is not available, companies turn to 
different models, with the help of which they attempt to forecast future processes. 
This is an acceptable effort, with relative reliability, in a predictable and calculable 
economic environment, while it is not in a crisis period. They argue for the pressing 
need to change the regulations, as the present regulation does not calculate with 
the data loss arising from the potential negative effects and the impacts thereof 
on the financial statements. They mentioned as a shortcoming to be eliminated 
that the present measurement system must be adjusted in line with the market 
conditions and supplemented with proper information in the statements.
Laux and Leuz (2009a; 2009b) believe that fair valuation cannot be made liable for 
the stimulation of the crisis and it should be regarded as nothing else but a potential 
3  Fair valuation standard of US GAAP, formerly FAS 157.
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measurement model. In their opinion the present rules alone do not represent 
the source of the crisis, but their interaction with other institutional frameworks 
may cause problems. In addition, they emphasise that the return to Historic Cost 
Accounting (HCA) cannot be regarded as a solution, as it reflects the current value 
of the asset to an even lesser degree. The solution may only be a short-term one: 
recognising a smaller amount of impairment. However, the critics of fair valuation 
must not disregard the fact that the model provided early warning signs of the 
approaching crisis, forcing banks to take the necessary measures. That is, despite 
all of its faults, fair valuation had effectively reduced the severity of the crisis.
Allan and Carletti (2008) believe that the main problem with fair valuation is that in 
a not sufficiently liquid market environment it is extremely difficult to estimate the 
fair value and in most cases we end up with an unreliable result. In this approach, 
in fact fair value can be defined as a kind of indicator of the liquidity level of the 
market. According to Gorton (2008), the other essential problem is that the fair 
valuation mechanism exerted pressure on credit institutions, and as a result of 
the estimation process built on uncertain future forecasts, often recognizing such 
impairments which led to the undervaluation of certain asset components.
Laux and Leuz (2010) refute the American position according which, with the 
exception of a few large banks, fair valuation had limited role in the changes of the 
banks’ income statement and solvency capital, as the banks decided on the increase 
of their subprime exposure independently and the fair valuation methodology 
cannot be blamed for the problems. Naturally, the topic was in the focus not only in 
the professional circles, taken in narrow sense. David Dodge, former governor of the 
Bank of Canada and Steve Forbes, chairman of Forbes Media vehemently asserted 
that fair valuation accelerated and boosted the crisis (McFarland – Partridge 2008). 
Nicholas Sarkozy (2008), in a speech delivered in 2008, also emphasised that “banks 
are subjected to the accounting rules, which do not provide sufficient guarantee for 
the avoidance of risk; moreover, in the case of a crisis they exacerbate the situation 
rather than absorbing the strength of the shock.”
According to the former chairman of the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Co, William 
Isaac, the application of fair valuation affected the banks’ capital to an unreasonably 
high degree, which contributed to the accomplishment of the crisis and to the 
economic downturn (Magnan 2009).
4. Fair valuation after the crisis
The most important lesson learnt from the crisis in terms of fair valuation is that 
rational regulation is essential for the maintenance of financial stability. The 
justification of this stems from the fact that the profit-oriented behaviour of the 
credit institutions may entail negative impacts (Pitz – Schepp 2013).
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As a result of the practical experiences and the aforementioned criticism, the IFRS 
13 standard4 was issued in May 2011 and it is effective from 1 of January 2015. 
It prescribes a uniform theoretical framework for the determination of fair value, 
which can be used both for financial and non-financial assets. IFRS 13 defines fair 
value as follows: “The price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer 
a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement 
date.”
Upon determining the fair value, certain key conditions had to be stipulated to 
ensure the reliability of the valuation result. The economic agent must determine
–  the fair valuation units of account (i.e. the evaluated asset or liability),
–  the primary market where the ordinary transaction would take place and the 
assumptions that would be applied by the market participants,
–  the highest degree and best utilisation of the assets in the case of non-financial 
assets, considering whether the assets may be used in combination with other 
assets or on their own.
The new standard emphasises that fair value is a market-based valuation. In the case 
of certain assets and liabilities, observable and comparable market transactions or 
market information may be available. According to Kovács (2012), the new standard 
emphasises, in addition to the precedence of market valuation, sector neutrality. In 
case of other assets and liabilities the appraiser may not have these. Irrespective 
of this, the purpose of fair valuation is the same in both cases: to estimate the 
price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an 
orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date under 
the existing market conditions.
This value is often referred to as “liquidation value”. In this sense, fair value means 
an exit price, realised at the time of the valuation between relevant market 
participants (the owner of the asset or the obligor of the liability).
The economic agent must use valuation methods suitable under the given 
circumstances and in respect of which sufficient data are available for the 
determination of the fair value, maximising the use of the observable input data 
and minimising the use of unknown information. The IFRS 13 (with some exceptions) 
requires the economic agent to group these valuations and disclosures into a “fair 
value hierarchy” consisting of three levels, which is based on the nature of the 
inputs.
4  International Financial Reporting Standard 13 – Fair value measurement standard 
58 Studies
Tamás Szücs – József Ulbert
Level 1 – Applies to financial assets and liabilities exchanged on an identifiable, 
active market. The realisation of the conditions is subject to the simultaneous 
fulfilment of the following two conditions: a) an existing market, where there is 
demand for and supply of the assets and liabilities; b) the transaction could be 
executed at the price specified by the economic agent at the given time of the 
valuation.
Level 2 – Such assets are allocated to this level that are not the quoted prices related 
to the asset or liability, applied by Level 1 (derived directly or indirectly from the 
market price). Due to the not fully independent price formation, these instruments 
cannot be allocated to Level 1. Upon the categorisation of this level the following 
cases are typical: a) the quoted price for the assets and liabilities similar to the 
given instrument is known; b) the quoted price for the assets and liabilities that 
are the same as or similar to the given instrument is known, but the market does 
not function at the time of the valuation; c) in addition to the quoted price, other 
indicators may also be identified in respect of the given instrument: interest rate, 
yield curve for the given subscription period, volatility, fastness of prepayment, loss-
related restrictions, credit risk, insolvency ratio, etc.; d) the price of the instrument 
can be derived from the market processes with the use of statistical methods (e.g. 
correlation, regression, averages).
Level 3 – If no relevant, observable inputs are available for the given instrument, 
unobservable parameters should be used for the determination of the fair value; 
thereby, such situations may be taken into consideration where the market activity 
is small at the time of the valuation. The purpose of the valuation at fair value 
remains the same: to determine a realistic exit price at the time of the valuation 
from the point of view of the market participant that is the owner of the asset or 
the obligor of the liability. Accordingly, the unobservable parameters must reflect 
the conditions that the market participants would use upon the pricing of the asset 
or liability, including in particular the assumptions related to risk. The economic 
agent is obliged to use the best information available under the given circumstances, 
which in part may also include the economic agent’s own data. 
The valuation logic of the first two levels is essentially built on market information 
(Mark to Market). The reliability of the obtained results is confirmed by the market 
processes. However, the valuation approaches of Level 3 are primarily based 
on model calculations (Mark to Model), for which IFRS 13 recommends several 
valuation methods to the economic agents: market-, cost- (historic cost) or yield-
based approach5 (Takács 2014 and 2015).
5  Yield-based valuation means the discounted profit or the discounted cash flow.
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After the publication of the standard (at the end of the more severe phase of 
the crisis), the technical literature dealing with fair valuation and the practice 
formulated much more polished and diverse criticism, free from political impacts, 
than before the crisis, focusing more on technical issues rather than on looking for 
somebody to be blamed.
The post-crisis technical literature is also divided in terms of how they judge fair 
valuation, but new elements also appear, supplementing the previous criticism. 
Of these new trends, perhaps the most important one for the essence of our 
paper is that fair valuation can be interpreted as an additional risk, but also as 
an opportunity. For example, according to the analyses performed by Reidl and 
Serafeim (2011) accounting for the financial instruments at fair value increases 
the cost of capital, i.e. entails a higher level of risk. Shaffer (2012) emphasises that 
fair valuation is not always objective, clear or transparent. It can lead to erroneous 
conclusions particularly in the case of inactive markets, in the absence of liquid 
markets or during the periods of market crises. On the other hand, according to 
other authors (Barth et al. 2012) fair valuation is not the direct cause of the crisis, as 
the valuation performed by it represents unrealised gain, hence it cannot be taken 
into consideration as the financing base of dividends. They also mention that fair 
value-based mentality (contrary to the historic cost) is able to treat the concept 
of good and bad news equally correctly. Having analysed British and German 
companies Christensen and Nikolaev (2013) found that in selecting the valuation 
method for non-financial assets economic and financial regulations are much more 
important than the market processes. 
Greenberg et al. (2013) provide a good summary of the more sophisticated post-
crisis approaches. In their paper they basically formulate three objections to fair 
valuation:
a)  the notion of objective “market price” is very confusing, and may be particularly 
misleading in less liquid markets;
b)  the mechanism of fair valuation may contribute to a larger degree to the infection 
of the given bank’s financial investments, if they have tight correlation with 
certain investment portfolios or with the financial relations of the network 
partners;
c)  in crisis situations fair valuation may often have coercive effect on the sale of 
certain assets, even though a higher price could be realised by holding them 
longer.
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On the whole, it can be established that the relevant technical literature and 
practice have a rather diverse approach to the fair valuation methodology. In the 
post-crisis technical literature there is no such opinion that would be expressly 
condemning. Not even in the approaches labelling it as the trigger of the crisis. 
On the other hand, we did not find such opinions either that would have solely 
emphasised that the crises could be addressed by fair valuation. This is due to the 
fact that most authors acknowledge the advantages of fair valuation compared 
to historic cost. On the other hand, the disadvantages that seemed to have been 
reinforced by the crisis are also clear.
The authors of this paper tend to take the middle course, according to which fair 
valuation may have contributed to the outbreak of the crisis, but it surely cannot 
be designated as the single cause. The other side also has its truth, as in expert 
hands fair valuation may indeed be capable of addressing problems. This duality 
can be also traced in our empirical research related to Hungarian credit institutions. 
However, it cannot be disputed that despite all of its errors and shortcomings, fair 
value has become/is becoming an increasingly applied asset valuation method. Its 
role has particularly appreciated in the credit institution sector, since this sector 
has also been in the centre of the crisis. 
5. Measurement of the Hungarian credit institution sector’s fair value 
involvement
The international empirical surveys relating to fair valuation usually examine the 
relevance of the values at the individual levels (Bagna et al. 2014; Kolev 2008 Goh 
et al. 2009; Song et al. 2010). In our future researches we also plan more detailed 
value relevance tests in the Hungarian credit institution sector, but for the time 
being, in this paper we deemed it more important, as a foundation of the topic, to 
present the weight of fair valuation on the asset and liability sides of the balance 
sheets in the Hungarian credit institution sector.
We elaborated a potential measurement method for the fair value involvement 
and sought answers to the following questions.
a)  How does the degree of fair value involvement change in the balance sheet of 
the Hungarian credit institutions?
b)  Is it possible to observe before, during and after the crisis typical patterns in 
the temporal change of fair value involvement, i.e. could the degree of the 
involvement be indicative of the imminent crisis or should we rather treat these 
patterns as causes triggering the crisis?
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c)  Are there significant differences in the patterns of involvement between the 
subsidiaries and the parent companies?
d)  What kind of special features can be observed in the involvement patterns in 
respect of OTP, as a leading Hungarian bank?
5.1. Database, transformation and time horizon of the empirical survey
The database was compiled from the annual consolidated financial statements for 
ten years (2006–2015) of OTP, and further five dominant actors of the Hungarian 
credit institution sector and their parent banks6, hence it contains balance sheets 
and income statements of the same structure in accordance with IFRS7. The ten-
year time series was broken down into four periods (Table 2), as in this way we can 
demonstrate the periodic changes in the effects of the crisis and fair valuation.
Table 2
Periods of the empirical analysis
Pre-crisis period 2006–2008, 3 years
Crisis period 2009–2010, 2 years
First post-crisis period 2011–2012, 2 years
Second post-crisis period 2013–2015, 3 years
From the annual nominal data we calculated periodic average annual data for 
the above periods by simple arithmetic averaging, after which we expressed the 
appropriate values of the asset and liability summary rows as a percentage of the 
prevailing balance sheet totals. The data of the subsidiaries and the parent banks 
were averaged, thus where the data disclosure refers to subsidiary it means the 
average of the subsidiaries.
5.2. Concept and measurement of fair value involvement
While examining the annual reports we found that the fair valuation methods could 
be traced only in the following balance sheet rows8.
6  Intesa Sanpaolo Group – CIB Bank Zrt., Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG – Raiffeisen Bank Zrt., Bayerische 
Landesbank (continuing the data series also after the transfer of MKB to state ownership!) – MKB Bank Zrt., 
KBC Group – K&H Bank Zrt., UniCredit Group – UniCredit Bank Hungary Zrt.
7  In case of Hungarian credit institutions the data are based on the annual reports uploaded to www.e-
beszamolo.hu (downloaded on 5 March 2016), while in the case of the parent banks they were collected 
from the annual reports published on the websites. The authors provide access to the database after prior 
registration. If you are interested, please contact us by e-mail.
8  On the asset side it was not possible to break down the data in an unambiguous way, hence we treated 
the affected rows together.
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Table 3
Scope of involvement in the balance sheets
Assets involved
Financial assets recognised against profit/loss
Ratio of derivative financial instruments
Ratio of financial investment available for sale
Liabilities involved
Liabilities recognised against profit/loss
After the described transformations of the input data, we obtained the fair value 
involvement’s primary indicator, which shows to what extent the fair valuation 
methodology was typical for the given bank, or rather for the average of the banks, 
on the asset and liability sides.
The primary involvement is expressed as a percentage of the balance sheet total and 
for the time being does not contain the internal structure of the fair value by levels.
Figures 1 and 2 show the temporal change of the primary involvement values, 
obtained after aggregating the input data according to the above method, on the 
asset and liability sides.
Figure 1
Temporal change of fair value involvement on the asset side as a percentage of the 
balance sheet total 
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Source: Calculated on the basis of aggregated data.
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If we also consider the level structures of fair valuation, we get even more perfect 
involvement data (secondary involvement).
Table 4
Source: Calculated on the basis of aggregated data.
Weight of Level 1 within the assets involved OTP SUBSIDIARY PARENT
Pre-crisis 63.79% 47.75% 51.06%
During the crisis 87.14% 49.43% 47.49%
First post-crisis period 58.83% 48.83% 44.17%
Second post-crisis period 78.39% 72.13% 54.10%
Weight of Level 2 within the assets involved OTP SUBSIDIARY PARENT
Pre-crisis 20.12% 50.34% 42.65%
During the crisis 9.66% 49.41% 48.54%
First post-crisis period 40.86% 49.48% 51.50%
Second post-crisis period 21.17% 27.19% 43.00%
Weight of Level 3 within the assets involved OTP SUBSIDIARY PARENT
Pre-crisis 16.09% 1.91% 7.20%
During the crisis 3.20% 1.16% 3.97%
First post-crisis period 0.31% 1.69% 4.33%
Second post-crisis period 0.44% 0.68% 2.90%
Source: Calculated on the basis of aggregated data
Figure 2
Temporal change of fair value involvement on the liability side as a percentage of 
the balance sheet total 
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Table 5
Weight of fair valuation by levels within the liabilities involved
Weight of Level 1 within the liabilities involved OTP SUBSIDIARY PARENT
Pre-crisis 0.01% 0.86% 23.23%
During the crisis 0.11% 1.62% 9.87%
First post-crisis period 0.26% 0.56% 7.84%
Second post-crisis period 0.16% 0.61% 12.24%
Weight of Level 2 within the liabilities involved OTP SUBSIDIARY PARENT
Pre-crisis 99.99% 96.99% 68.70%
During the crisis 99.89% 98.16% 85.87%
First post-crisis period 95.47% 96.45% 87.77%
Second post-crisis period 99.84% 99.25% 85.59%
Weight of Level 3 within the liabilities involved OTP SUBSIDIARY PARENT
Pre-crisis 0.00% 2.15% 8.07%
During the crisis 0.00% 0.22% 4.26%
First post-crisis period 4.26% 2.99% 4.39%
Second post-crisis period 0.00% 0.14% 2.16%
Source: Calculated on the basis of aggregated data.
5.3. Most important results of the empirical analysis in respect of the primary 
involvement (Figures 1 and 2)
•  The involvement is substantially higher on the asset side than on the liability side. 
This finding is independent both from the period and the classification. Obviously, 
this also follows from the feature of the balance sheet, since on the liability side 
the equity cannot be valued at fair value. 
•  The involvement of the parent banks with international presence substantially 
exceeds the involvement of their subsidiaries and also that of OTP. This finding 
holds true in all periods under review, both on the asset and the liability sides. 
Accordingly, the degree of primary involvement can be traced back both to the 
size and the international nature.
•  OTP is the least affect. This finding also applies to all periods and appears to 
be confirmed both on the asset and liability sides. OTP is not under any parent 
bank’s “pressure” in respect of the valuation of the asset components. The parent 
company’s instructions for sure play an important role in the development and 
valuation of the subsidiaries’ asset structure.
•  The OTP’s fair value strategy on the asset side and the relation thereof to the 
crisis significantly differ from the parent banks’ asset side fair value crisis strategy. 
The OTP’s asset side primary involvement level before the crisis was by far the 
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smallest. However, during the crisis it doubled and thereafter it practically 
stagnated. The parent banks’ primary involvement was the highest before the 
crisis. It somewhat declined as a result of the crisis. However, thereafter it once 
again rises, albeit to a smaller degree. 
•  The subsidiary banks’ primary involvement curves on the assets side resemble 
to that of OTP rather than of their own parent banks (see Figure 1). Accordingly, 
in the case of the international large banks we tend to designate more easily the 
possibility of fair valuation as an important medium leading to the crisis than in 
the case of the smaller Hungarian credit institutions, which settle for a follower 
strategy. Large banks are also characterised by higher willingness to take risks, 
as – compared to the balance sheet total – the ratio of those assets and liabilities 
that are valued at fair value is higher. Before and after the crisis there was no 
material change in the primary involvement compared to the balance sheet total.
•  This suggests that the asset side fair value crisis strategy of the Hungarian credit 
institution sector differs from the international trends. Receivables from customers 
and other credit institutions are dominant asset components, which were valued 
at amortised historic cost.
•  It is a reasonable question whether the different activity structure and the 
corresponding different balance sheet structure may alone explain the different 
fair value crisis strategy. For this we had to examine the ratio of the receivables 
and their change in time. We obtained the following results:
Table 6
Ratio of receivables (customers, credit institutions) to the balance sheet total
Subsidiary Parent OTP
Pre-crisis 77.34% 62.73% 73.88%
During the crisis 71.21% 63.11% 72.20%
First post-crisis period 66.61% 62.99% 70.34%
Second post-crisis period 62.56% 63.52% 57.36%
Source: Calculated on the basis of aggregated data.
It shows that the activity structure and the change thereof in time did not cause 
any tangible change in the parent banks’ balance sheet structure. However, in case 
of the subsidiary banks a major structural change occurred, which was joined by 
OTP, although with a small delay, but more dynamically.
Obviously this clearly traceable trend can be attributed to several factors: the frozen 
credit market, and /or the continuous phase-out, prepayment and final repayment 
of the foreign currency loans, etc. However, the analysis of this is beyond the scope 
of this paper. However, it can be stated that substantial differences in the balance 
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sheet structure of the parent and subsidiary banks are more typical before the crisis. 
This is not the case after the crisis. Due to this, in the case of the parent banks the 
ratio of the financial assets valued at fair value was perceivably higher only before 
the crisis. The answer to our question cannot be deemed straightforward by far, 
hence the problem needs further analysis.
The same question arises in respect of the hedging transactions: i.e. whether the 
difference in the fair value crisis strategy can be attributed to the different ratio 
of those. Having analysed this question as well, we came to the conclusion that it 
cannot, as the share of hedging transactions is marginal in the Hungarian subsidiary 
banks’ balance sheets. It is hardly higher in the balance sheets of the parent banks:
Table 7
Change in the ratio of hedging transactions in time 
Description Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Subsidiary Parent Subsidiary Parent OTP
Pre-crisis 0.54% 0.44% 0.40% 0.48% 0.09% 0.15%
During the crisis 0.34% 0.91% 0.14% 0.73% 0.14% 0.70%
First post-crisis period 0.40% 1.32% 0.43% 1.23% 0.13% 0.85%
Second post-crisis period 0.61% 0.88% 0.25% 1.06% 0.23% 0.69%
Average (2006–2015) 0.49% 0.88% 0.31% 0.90% 0.15% 0.56%
Source: Calculated on the basis of aggregated data.
5.4 Most important results of the empirical analysis in respect of the secondary 
involvement (see: Tables 4 and 5)
5.4.1. Temporal trends
Compared to the pre-crisis situation, in the subsequent periods (particularly in 
the second period of the stabilisation) we can see on both the asset and liability 
sides that the role of Level 3 substantially dropped, i.e. there are distinct efforts 
on both sides of the balance sheet by the market participants to transform the 
internal structure of their fair value involvement at the expense of Level 3. This 
reaction may be clearly interpreted as risk mitigation, or at least it carries a clear 
message to the potential investors, promising the cleaning of the balance sheets 
form the “elements of higher risk”. Surprisingly, this impact is less strong in the 
relation to the subsidiaries and OTP than in case of parent banks, which essentially 
can be attributed to two reasons. On the one hand, to the independent decisions 
of the banks, and to the other hand, to the changes in the Hungarian financial 
legislation. This is particularly true for OTP. Namely, during 2010 the bonds issued 
in the Hungarian municipality sector were reclassified as loans. Unfortunately, 
no active market developed in Hungary for municipal bonds, hence the credit 
institutions were unable to allocate a relevant market value to these bonds. Based 
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on the analysis of the accounting content of the given instrument they found that 
these instruments satisfy the IAS 39 standard, i.e. they can be defined as loans/
receivables; thus, from that time they were valued at amortised historic cost 
rather than at fair value. Another effect is the valuation changes based on the 
banks’ individual decisions, which in case of OTP was attributable to the hedging 
transactions elaborated for covering the exchange rate risk of the foreign currency-
denominated mortgage loans. Upon the valuation of the cross-currency interest rate 
swaps, due to the speculations related to the EUR/CHF spreads, the bank deemed 
the market quotes less reliable, hence it decided to reallocate the respective 
portfolio from Level 2 to Level 3. In 2012, with the improvement in the quality of 
information, it was reclassified as Level 2. The situation was similar in case of the 
subsidiaries as well. The hedging transactions’ value was measured by model-based 
valuation instead of the market-based measurement. This explains the slightly rising 
data of the given period.
During the crisis (2008–2009) and in the period thereafter (2010–2011) the parent 
companies typically demonstrated prudency in the area of fair valuation. They 
reviewed the reliability of the value of their assets and liabilities, allocated to Level 
1, valued purely on the basis of market information. The reliability of the business 
and market information in that period was highly questionable. Due to the general 
rise in volatility, certain instruments were hit by major price or exchange rate 
fluctuations; thus, the trust in the results of the repeatedly performed valuations 
was shaken. Due to the ambiguous results, the valuation purely based on market 
information was increasingly replaced by the adjusted valuation, supplemented by 
financial models. We can see this in the rise in the assets’ (Table 4) Level 2 ratios 
compared to the previous period. In the post-crisis period these effects disappeared 
and the process took a reverse direction. Once again the ratio of Level 1 increased 
at the expense of Levels 2 and 3, as the market data became increasingly reliable 
and the volatility decreased.
Despite the special domestic effects, we can state as a fact that in the Hungarian 
credit institution sector the weight of Level 3 in the second post-crisis period is 
generally materially lower than before the crisis, i.e. albeit with a small delay we 
follow the efforts and trends of risk elimination, appearing more strikingly at the 
parent banks.
5.4.2. Structural trends of the balance sheet and the fair valuation levels
On the asset side we can see that by the end of the period under review, all 
actors raised the weight of Level 1 above the pre-crisis index. Thus, Level 1 clearly 
has a dominant role in the fair value involvement, which is attributable to the 
improvement in the reliability of market information and to the clear effort that 
the Hungarian credit institution actors regarded it as one way to recover from the 
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crisis to modify the balances sheet and fair value level structure in such a way that 
clearly delivers the message to the investors on the intention to reduce risks.
This is how they intended to comply to a higher degree with the standard’s 
requirements related to fair valuation, according to which the economic agent 
that wishes to apply it should do its best to use reliable market information for the 
valuation to the highest possible degree.
The dominant role of Level 2 is evident on the liability side. This is primarily 
attributable to the hedging transactions, in the valuation of which the market data 
is an important element, which is not necessarily available directly. The final balance 
sheet value can be determined by deriving it from the market price and rate of other 
instruments, after performing the necessary adjustments. Anyway, the deployment 
of the valuation methodology machinery is necessary to some degree in all cases. 
Very similar structural changes occurred on the liability side as on the asset side.
Accordingly, our findings correspond to the correlations identified in the technical 
literature. The crisis clearly has an influence on the fair valuation strategy, as it 
evokes such adjustment mechanisms, the key objective of which is to reduce the 
additional risk inherent in fair valuation. This also means that the fair valuation 
strategy indirectly reacts upon the crisis, as it exerts an influence on the level of 
market risk. In this sense, particularly the weight of Level 3 may play a material role 
as potential means of recovering from the crisis.
5.5. Fair value involvement as risk indicator
We also examined the role of the individual levels in the periods under review on 
the asset and liability sides of the balance sheet. In this respect we paid special 
attention to Level 3, as this bears the highest risks, because at this level the valuation 
is performed by models. We restricted the analysis to the asset side, because on 
the liability side the weight of Level 3 compared to the prevailing balance sheet 
total is negligible.
This is already a sufficiently aggregated and optimised indicator, which may rightly 
be treated as the risk indicator of the fair valuation involvement, also reflecting the 
weight of the “risky items” in the balance sheets (asset side). This indicator, boiling 
down the additional risk of fair valuation to a single figure, may be suitable to deliver 
important information to the investors on the credit institution’s real accounting 
policy and the impact thereof on the exposure.
It is very easy to calculate it: the primary and secondary involvement indicators 
must be multiplied by each other at each level; thus, obtaining the weight of the 
individual levels compared to the balance sheet total.
On the asset side we try to present the role of Level 3, since this level may carry 
the highest investment risk due to its content.
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The trends are clearly reflected by Figure 3. Before the crisis, the international 
parent banks relied on the possibility of Level 3 to a substantially larger extent 
than their Hungarian subsidiaries or OTP. Essentially, this difference did not change 
during or after the crisis; however, it is a major difference that after the crisis the 
inherent risk halved, as the weight of Level 3 is hardly half of the pre-crisis indicator.
The reaction of the actors was extremely fast. They tried to shift a large part of their 
assets subject to fair valuation on Level 3 towards Level 1 and 2, which continuously 
reduced the role and weight of Level 3 in their balance sheets. The subsidiaries’ and 
OTP’s risk of this type became balanced, while the parent banks’ exposure (ratio to 
the balance sheet total) is still almost six times higher than the Hungarian average.
If we also consider the magnitude of the balance sheet totals and not only the ratios 
to those, then according to our estimation (calculating with the prevailing average 
annual foreign currency exchange rates), on the asset side of the parent banks’ 
balance sheets the amount affected by Level 3 was on average around EUR 140 
million before the crisis, which fell back to one-third by the 4th period. Compared 
to this, the involvement of the domestic subsidiaries and OTP was negligible.
Figure 3
Temporal change in the risk rate of fair value involvement
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6. Summary and outlook
According to our finding, the fair value involvement can be measured at three levels:
•  primary involvement means the ratio of the individual balance sheet items to 
the balance sheet total, which is the primary point of orientation on the scope 
of fair valuation;
•  secondary involvement is when the structure of the involvement is measured at 
the levels of fair valuation, also as ratio of the balance sheet total;
•  in our opinion, the fair valuation involvement, as risk indicator, can be applied, 
if we express the weight of Level 3 on the asset side as a ratio of the balance 
sheet total.
As regards the debate in the technical literature on the relation between fair 
valuation and the crisis, we can add that in the Hungarian credit institution sector 
the crisis generated clearly demonstrable adjustment mechanisms, which were 
realised in the fall of additional risks inherent in the fair value involvement.
We found that in case of the parent banks and their subsidiaries the adjustment 
took place not at the same pace and not in a homogenous manner. In our view 
this may have been mostly attributable to the fact that the Hungarian actors did 
not capitalise on the fair valuation opportunities to the same degree as the parent 
companies covered by the analysis.
We explain this finding by the material differences in the ratio of assets valued 
against profit/loss and – within equity – against the valuation reserve9, which are 
as follows:
Table 8
Average ratios of recognitions against profit/loss versus, within equity, against the 
valuation reserve (OCI) in the period under review
Description Subsidiary Parent OTP
Ratio of assets valued against profit/loss 20.34% 59.88% 11.43%
Ratio of assets valued against OCI 79.66% 40.12% 88.57%
Source: Calculated on the basis of aggregated data.
It is clear that the domestic subsidiaries (and OTP), as mentioned before, prefer the 
more prudent valuation methods. By contrast, in respect of the recognition of the 
valuation difference, the parent companies give preference to recognition against 
9  Components valued against Other Comprehensive Income (OCI) according to the international technical 
literature.
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profit/loss. Thus, parent companies capitalise on the flexibility provided by fair 
valuation more often than the Hungarian subsidiaries.
Obviously, we do not regard our research as completed. In many respects it left at 
least as many questions open as the number of questions it answered. Accordingly, 
several publications are yet to follow, as the value relevance analyses and the value 
measurement practice outside the credit institution sector can still contribute a lot 
to the general acceptability of our findings; thus, our research will be focused on 
this in the near future.
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